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Panel I: The Conflict Between 
Commercial Speech and Legislation 
Governing the Commercialization of 
Public Sector Data 
Moderator:     James Goodale* 
Panelists:       Robert Sherman** 
                      Paul Schwartz*** 
                      Deirdre Mulligan**** 
                      Steven Emmert***** 
 
MR. GOODALE: The issue today we are going to try to grapple 
with is: Privacy and the First Amendment: Is there a tension; and if 
so, where is it? 
I want to welcome to the panel, Steve Emmert, who is Director 
of Government Affairs for LEXIS-NEXIS, Reed Elsevier, Inc.; 
Deirdre Mulligan, who is at the Center for Democracy & 
Technology; Paul Schwartz, who is a Professor at Brooklyn Law 
School, and who teaches courses in the Internet and 
telecommunications; and Bob Sherman, a partner at Paul Hastings, 
who I have talked into being our opening speaker.  He told me just 
before we started that he submitted an amicus brief in the United 
Reporting Publishing case,1 which was decided by the Supreme 
Court, and which tangentially raises some of the issues to which 
we wish to address our attention.  He also has kindly, not only 
agreed to be the first speaker, but has said that in his speech he 
 
 *  Founder, Media/Communications/Intellectual Property Section, Debevoise & 
Plimpton; Adjunct Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  Yale 
University, B.A. 1955; University of Chicago Law School, J.D. 1960. 
 **  Partner, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker; General Counsel, Direct Marketing 
Association.  University of Rhode Island, B.A. 1967; The American University Law 
School, J.D. 1971. 
 ***  Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  Brown University, B.A. 1981; Yale Law 
School, J.D. 1985. 
 ****  Staff Counsel, Center for Democracy & Technology.  Smith College, B.A. 1988; 
Georgetown University Law School, J.D. 
 *****  Director of Government & Industry Affairs, LEXIS-NEXIS, Reed Elsevier, Inc.  
The Ohio State University, B.A. 1979; J.D. 1982. 
 1 See Los Angeles Police Dept v. United Reporting Publg Corp., 528 U.S. 32 
(1999). 
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would try to frame the issue. 
So, sir, you are on. 
MR. SHERMAN: Thank you, I think. 
First of all, I am pleased to be here.  I want to thank everybody 
who made it possible for me to participate. 
I want to spend the first couple of minutes describing where the 
industry is today and then try to frame the issues regarding the 
tension between the First Amendment and privacy. 
I found the first two speakers comments very enlightening.  I 
wish I had a few hours to respond to them, but I dont.  The 
industry now is pretty much in a self-regulatory mode.2  There are 
not many privacy statutes that directly affect marketing and 
commercial speech.  There are a few, but only a few.3  And so, 
right now the industry is depending on trying to do the right thing. 
What that comes down to are five elements of self-regulation 
that are now being followed.  Lets see where they fit into the 
tension between the First Amendment and privacy. 
The first is notice: let the consuming public know what your 
privacy practices are.  Put simply, they are entitled to be aware and 
make informed choices.  That, of course, is a perfect segue into 
point number two, which is choice.  It should be left to the 
consumer to choose what is done with his or her personally 
identifiable information.4  Of course, there is a raging debate on 
whether that should be opt-in or opt-out,5 and I am going to 
 
 2 See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1193, 1247 (1998).  See also A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (July 
1, 1997), available at http://www.ecommerce.gov/framework.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 
2000). 
 3 See Kang, supra note 2, at 1231-32 ([O]f those statutes governing the collection 
of personal information, none are particularly constraining.). 
 4 See Comments of the Direct Marketing Association on Elements of Effective Self 
Regulation for the Protection of Privacy and Questions Related to Online Privacy (July 
6, 1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/privacy/mail/disk/DMA.htm 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2000); see also Kang, supra note 2, at 1247. 
 5 See, e.g., Leslie A. Kurtz, The Invisible Becomes Manifest: Information Privacy in 
a Digital Age, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 151, 170 (1998) (discussing opt-in and opt-out 
regulation); Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in 
Electronic Commerce: Why Self-Regulation Is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REV. 847 (1998) 
(proposing model statute seeking to address consumer privacy concerns in lieu of 
industry self-regulation). 
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address that in a few minutes. 
So, notice and choice are really bedrock to sound privacy 
principles. 
The third one has created real controversy, and that is the notion 
of access.  The European Union is pushing hard for access.6  It is a 
concept that is familiar to those who conduct their businesses 
subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act,7 but it is something that 
really is alien to commercial or marketing companies.  After all, 
what does access mean?  Access to what?  Does it come with the 
right to correct?  If it does, how important is it to ones privacy to 
be able to correct transactional data  for example, I bought a blue 
shirt, but my records say I bought a green shirt and I want that 
fixed up.  At what expense?  At whose expense? 
Does any right to access reach data and information that are 
inferred by marketing companies that did not get this information 
from you but perhaps obtained it through modeling or other 
methods they believe apply to you?  Is there such a thing as 
correcting those types of data? 
Access is an important issue that is right now being debated, as 
we heard from our keynoters.  The Federal Trade Commission is 
holding hearings on what has been dubbed profiling, and access 
is a key issue there.8 
Then, of course, there is security.  Whether it is online or 
through traditional media, I do not believe anybody will argue with 
the fact that personally identifiable information should be kept in 
secure places and in secure ways. 
Finally, what is the enforcement regime?  What are the 
punishments or the sanctions for anybody who violates whatever 
the appropriate way to handle data is?  That is pretty much what 
the self-regulatory process is requiring now. 
 
 6 See Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data, Part Two, ¶ 13 (Sept. 23, 1980), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/PRIV-EN.HTM (last visited Nov. 1, 2000) 
(recommending that individuals have the right to access information maintained by data 
controllers about him/herself). 
 7 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). 
 8 See Workshop Notice, Department of Commerce Federal Trade Commission 
Workshop on Online Profiling, Fed. Reg. Docket No. 990811219-9219-01, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9909/FRN990915.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2000). 
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A large, indeed leading, industry association has made a privacy 
promise to the American public.9  It is requiring each of the above-
referenced principles to be honored or a member company that 
fails to do so is expelled from the organization, perhaps publicly 
censured, and if it also results in a legal violation of some kind, 
then the file is turned over to a law enforcement agency.10 
So those are the key elements of self-regulation.  We believe it 
works and we believe it should be permitted to continue to work. 
But what are the conflicting forces here in trying to do the right 
thing and in having government and law enforcement agencies 
allow business to do the right thing while still making sure that all 
constitutional and other protections are provided? 
Lets go back to the 18th century.  Benjamin Franklin, in 1744, 
actually developed the first catalogue.11  He mailed out 600 of 
them.12  His sole goal was to have everybody pay the same price, 
everybody treated the same way, everybody get the same customer 
service.13  During that same period of time, 55% to 75% of the 
pages in newspapers consisted of ads - almost exclusively 
commercial information.14  In fact, the first case that defended free 
speech was a commercial case.15 
And so, when the Framers drafted the First Amendment and 
interchangeably used the words freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press,16 there is little doubt that what they had in mind 
 
 9 See generally, Online Privacy Alliance, Effective Enforcement of Self Regulation: 
Verification and Monitoring,  available at 
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/enforcement.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2000);  
The DMAs Privacy Promise in Direct Marketing Association: The United States of 
America Land of Opportunity Direct Marketing An Overview, available at 
http://www.the-dma.org/librarylandofopportunity.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2000). 
 10 See generally, Online Privacy Alliance, Effective Enforcement of Self Regulation: 
Consumer Complaint Resolution,  available at 
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/enforcement.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2000).   
 11 See Benjamin Franklin, A CATALOGUE OF CHOICE AND VALUABLE BOOKS, 
Philadelphia (1744). 
 12 See id. 
 13 See id. 
 14 See generally, ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE, THE DAILY NEWSPAPER IN AMERICA: THE 
EVOLUTION OF A SOCIAL INSTRUMENT 31-33 (1937). 
 15 Republica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 319 (1788). 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Melville B. Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a 
Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 641 
(1975) (suggesting that the Framers may have regarded freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press as interchangeable).  But see Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public 
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included commercial free speech.  Commercial speech then clearly 
was a first-class citizen.  There was no difference in the treatment 
of political speech and commercial speech. 
Now lets fast-forward.  In 1980, after some serious struggle, the 
U.S. Supreme Court, in Central Hudson,17 established a four-step 
test to determine whether or not the right to commercial free 
speech was being violated.18 
The four steps essentially are: (1) the state has to demonstrate a 
substantial state interest; (2) it has to show that the regulation of 
speech was in proportion to that interest; (3) it has to demonstrate 
that in achieving that goal it has to directly advance the state 
interest; and (4) it has to do so in the least-restrictive manner, 
which subsequently has been modified to require that it be in a 
tailored way or in a way where there is a reasonable fit between 
the restriction and the goal to be achieved.19 
In summary, that is what the First Amendment side requires: a 
substantial state interest, regulation proportionate to the interest, 
the direct advancement of that interest, and doing so in a tailored 
manner.  In other words, the restrictions may not be overly broad, 
excessive, or go further than they have to.20 
On the other side of this equation is the issue of privacy.  There 
is no question about there being a right to privacy, but you will 
never find the word in the Constitution.21  It is not really well-
defined.22  In 1965, Griswold v. Connecticut,23 referred to it as a 
penumbra or a zone that covered many different kinds of 
rights.24  But before one can tread on First Amendment grounds, 
 
Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order From Confusion in 
Defamation Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 91, 117-18 (1987) (stating that [T]he intent of the 
Framers with regard to the speech and press clauses is unclear.). 
 17 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557 (1980). 
 18 See id. at 564-66. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See, e.g., ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
(Vintage Books 1997) (1995). 
 22 See Fred H. Cate, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 3 (Brookings Institution 
Press 1997) (explaining the lack of consensus of what privacy means). 
 23 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 24 See id. at 483 ([T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected 
from governmental intrusion.). 
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one must have something more than an abstract concept.25  The 
concept must be concretely defined, there must be some 
demonstrated harm, before one abridges free speech.26  The 
Griswold definition of a zone or a penumbra does not appear to 
provide the justification. 
In 1973, Roe v. Wade27 held that only personal rights that can be 
deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty 
are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.28  The Court 
gave examples such as marriage, procreation, contraception and 
family relationships as those areas of privacy that are protected by 
the Constitution.29 
Then the tension began to mount.  In the 1960s, the Supreme 
Court stated that requiring people to give one permission to 
communicate to them violates free speech.30  When it comes to 
speech, inhibition and inconvenience, as well as prohibition, 
violate the First Amendment.31  The famous quote out of that case 
was [I]t would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only 
sellers and no buyers.32  Clearly there was a recognized right to 
communicate; equally clearly there was a right not to have true 
privacy invaded. 
Then more recently, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,33 
where the more modern techniques of targeted marketing were 
involved, the Supreme Court decided that a state may not restrict 
solicitations in a way so that what would be left is the ability to 
contact only those least likely to respond to a promotion.34  In 
other words, target marketing is not bad per se.35  The Court did 
not address the issue of privacy, of how one determines the 
 
 25 See Cate, supra note 22, at 55. 
 26 See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993). 
 27 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 28 Id. at 152 (citations omitted). 
 29 See id. at 152-53. 
 30 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (holding that requiring 
addressee to request delivery of his mail in writing is an unconstitutional abridgment of 
the addressees First Amendment rights). 
 31 See id. at 309 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 32 Id. at 308. 
 33 486 U.S. 466 (1988). 
 34 See id. at 479. 
 35 See id. at 476 ([M]erely because targeted, direct-mail solicitation presents lawyers 
with opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban on that 
mode of protected commercial speech.). 
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targeted audience, by what means, what computers, et cetera.36 
The speakers on this panel are supposed to discuss the tension 
between the First Amendment and privacy with respect to public 
data.  Of course, the fact that data are required to be made public, 
presumably, serves a public interest.  Why else would the state or 
the federal government require that information to be placed on the 
public record?  So one must ask, Why is that information required 
in the first place?  Why is it required to be public?  There is a 
public interest being served just by the simple fact that the data are 
made public. 
Once they are made public, one could argue that any privacy 
interest starts to fade.  The information is public.  The very 
antithesis of private is public. 
Then the issue seems to become: If the subjects of the 
information that has been made public were not given a choice, 
should they have been; and, if so, should it be opt-out or opt-
in?37 
Referring back to the bullet points of what self-regulation covers 
now - notice, choice, access, security, and sanctions - the choice 
element may be viewed as either heres what we do; were going 
to do it unless you say not to; or heres what we would like to 
do; we wont do it unless you say its okay.  The first one is opt-
out  we are going to do it unless you say no.38  The second one is 
opt-in.39  Clearly, opt-in raises First Amendment issues by 
creating additional impediments for commercial communication.40 
I would like to make one point before attempting to join the 
issue, and that is to highlight the one aspect of the First 
Amendment that seems to be completely overlooked in all of the 
debates, that I either have heard or participated in.  Central 
 
 36 See generally id. 
 37 See Leslie A. Kurtz, The Invisible Becomes Manifest: Information Privacy in a 
Digital Age, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 151, 170 (1998) (There are two basic approaches to the 
issue of choice and consent, generally called opt-out and opt-in.). 
 38 See id. ([A]n opt-out approach . . . presupposes permission to use and disclose 
personal information unless the consumer takes affirmative steps to state an objection.). 
 39 See id. (stating that under an opt-in approach . . . information cannot be used for 
purposes other than that for which it was given and cannot be disclosed to others unless 
the consumer expressly agrees or opts in). 
 40 See id. 
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Hudson41 not only stated that it is the speakers right to 
communicate his or her message, but also that it is the listeners or 
readers right to receive the message.42  Listeners and readers have 
First Amendment rights, and when one treads on that aspect of the 
First Amendment, one violates the Constitution the same as when 
one inhibits or prohibits the speakers right to be heard.43 
One must ask the question: If there are a number of willing 
listeners or readers, then, by requiring all of them to take some 
affirmative action before one can communicate with them, isnt the 
communicator being restricted or inhibited, or being confronted 
with artificial obstacles with respect to those who want to receive 
the communication?  The First Amendment does not allow that. 
I was hoping I would go last because, as a litigator, I am well 
aware of the advantage of being heard last. But going first wasnt 
so bad because I had a chance to pose a lot of questions, without 
having to answer them. 
Opt-in versus opt-out, just a few observations about that 
debate. 
Historically, the self-regulatory regime has been notice and opt-
out.44  It is friendly to the free flow of information.  It allows that 
flow unless someone feels so strongly that they say no, thank you, 
I dont want to be included in this, I dont want to have my name 
and address transferred to another marketer who may have 
information that is valuable to me, or who may send a solicitation 
that I may want, but I have chosen not to receive it, so I opt-out.  
That has historically been the methodology.45 
Even legislative requirements, few as they were, had taken the 
opt-out approach.  That was changed by the Childrens Online 
Privacy Protection Act,46 which requires affirmative parental 
consent, verifiable consent by the parent, i.e. opt-in, before one 
 
 41 See 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 42 See id. at 567. 
 43 See id. at 567-68. 
 44 See generally Linda A. Goldstein, Emerging Issues in Online Advertising and 
Promotion Law, 570 PLI/PAT 821 (1999); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No 
Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033 
(1999). 
 45 See generally Sovern, supra note 44. 
 46 See Childrens Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6505 
(1998). 
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can collect information from a child, as distinguished from 
information about a child.47 
The new Health Data Privacy Guidelines categorize certain 
types of information from certain types of relationships,48 e.g., 
physician-patient where it may require the affirmative consent of 
the patient before that information may be disclosed or transferred. 
But when it comes to general marketing or transactional 
information, historically it has always been opt-out. 
What are the pros and cons of each?  They both result in 
consumer choice.  There is no greater or lesser protection after the 
consumer has exercised that choice.  The consumer either will or 
will not participate in the marketing process, depending on whether 
he or she says okay or not okay. 
Opt-out is certainly friendlier to the free flow of information 
because it allows the flow unless somebody says no.  Opt-in is 
viewed by many as creating barriers to entry.  It creates difficulties 
for new, small, under-capitalized, potential competitors.  They may 
not have the wherewithal to go through the permission process that 
it takes.  As can be seen, there are other problems (besides First 
Amendment v. Privacy) that have to be considered when 
examining opt-in. 
In the interest of full disclosure, I have spent the last twenty-
eight years representing the direct marketing industry, which more 
recently includes the e-commerce and Internet companies.  The 
Direct Marketing Association (the DMA), for which I serve as 
general counsel, has acquired two major Internet trade 
associations.49  So, although I personally, and the industry 
generally, respect and seek to honor privacy principles and privacy 
requests, we also have to stand tall when it comes to the right to be 
heard and the consumers right to receive information that they 
may find valuable. 
 
 47 See id. 
 48 See Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 295, 333 (1995); see generally, Health Privacy Project: Institute for 
Health Care Research and Policy Georgetown University, available at 
http://www.healthprivacy.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2000). 
 49 See Courtney Macavinta, Lobbying Group Acquires Internet Alliance, (May 4, 
1999), available at CNET News.com http://news.cnet.com/category/0-1005-200-
342053.html. (last visited Nov. 1, 2000); see also, DMA Affiliates, available at 
http://www.the-dma.org/aboutdma/dmaaffiliates.shtml  (last visited Nov. 18, 2000). 
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Maybe this is a good time to sit down.  Thank you for your time 
and attention. 
MR. GOODALE: Thank you very much. 
I have to tell you that the decision to have the first speaker speak 
first was only made about six minutes ago, and immediately the 
first speaker gets up and has five points.  Only a litigator can do 
that. 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Let me begin by saying I am happy 
to see Peter Swire in the audience, a friend of mine from law 
school, and the first privacy advisor to the Federal Government.  I 
have enjoyed talking with Peter over the years about privacy and 
many other issues.  He is doing a great job in D.C., and I am very 
happy to see him here. 
Now, what I wanted to do is make only three points, but I am 
going to make a fourth point, because for me its a little surprising 
to have someone, Mr. Sherman, first tell us how great self-
regulation is, but then also tell us he has been working for the 
DMA for twenty-eight years and has been part of the ongoing 
DMA activities with self-regulation.  Now I could be wrong, but 
my impression was that, historically, self-regulation by the DMA 
has not been a success and that it has essentially been used to stave 
off more effective regulation.50  Historically, self-regulation has 
been mostlyand I may be wronga smoke screen.51  And so for 
us to hear today that self-regulation has worked and it is now going 
to work in e-commerce, well, my perspective, which, again, may 
be incorrect, is that, due to a lot of pressure on the direct marketing 
industry, it is trying to get ahead of the legislative bandwagon by 
sprinting to the front and trying to make its policies somewhat 
more effective. 
I think there is room for self-regulation.  There is also room for 
thinking about using markets to regulate, and using norms to 
regulate, and using self-regulation to regulate.  We should not only 
depend on law and command and control regulation.  But 
nevertheless, to the extent that the direct marketing industry has 
moved in the right direction, it has been because of a lot of outside 
 
 50 See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY 
OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION n.5 & 332 (1996). 
 51 See Sovern, supra note 44, at 1081. 
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pressure, including that of privacy advocates and journalists and 
other people pointing out that historically their record has been 
poor.52  But again, I could be wrong. 
But by the way, what this last comment doesnt mean is that 
direct marketers should not try self-regulation and that we should 
not encourage more creative forms of regulation in the twenty-first 
century.  But I also think we should bring an awareness of the 
history and see if we cannot learn from the past. 
MR. SHERMAN: Well, we agree in part. 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: There we go. 
MR. SHERMAN: You were wrong. 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Okay.  Well, its not the first time. 
Let me then make three points.  I want to talk about privacys 
constitutive role; then I want to talk about fair information 
practices, which Mr. Sherman also mentioned; and then I want to 
talk about free speech versus privacy. 
How should we think about information privacy?  I think, as our 
first speaker has pointed out, it is a slippery concept and it can 
mean many different things in our legal system.53  One leading 
approach is thinking of privacy as a right of control, namely, that 
the state should decide to give you more or less control over your 
information based on the circumstances.54  I think that this notion, 
this vision, this paradigm, has not worked out particularly well,55 
and I want to briefly point out two reasons for the failure of 
privacy-as-control. 
One problem is that privacy-as-control looks to the exception 
and not the rule.56  There are many reasons in the Information Age 
that data about us are collected, stored, and processed; and so if we 
view privacy within this control notion, very quickly we see that 
there are real limits on the desirability of an individual controlling 
 
 52 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the 
U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 542-46 (1995). 
 53 See infra p. 5; see also Reidenberg, supra note 52, at 498. 
 54 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1609, 1659 (1999). 
 55 See id. at 1660-64. 
 56 See id. at 1663. 
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her information.57  In other words, an external social reality is 
reflected in your personal information, and neither the state nor the 
private sector is going to want to allow us too much of a right of 
control.  Put differently, we can not have a complete right to 
rewrite events that actually took place.58  That would be highly 
problematic.59 
Second, it seems to me the idea of privacy as control runs into 
difficulty once we give up our information.60  This kind of interest, 
this idea of privacy-as-control, functions best when information is 
kept secret or known only by a small group.  But the critical issue 
today is usually not whether personal data should be collected and 
processed, but how data should be and should not be used. 
So what, then, do we want from privacy if it is not this notion of 
control?  Well, I think we should think of privacy as doing 
something constitutive.61  Access to personal information and 
limits on it help form the society in which we live and shape our 
individual identities.62  Information privacy, whether on or off the 
Internet, should be considered to be a constitutive value.63  As an 
example, the structure of access to personal information will have 
a decisive impact in many instances on the extent to which certain 
actions or expressions of identity will be encouraged or 
discouraged.64  Therefore, the importance of information privacy 
for both individuals and the community necessitates attention to 
how we set the boundaries about personal information.65 
Now, let me move on to my second point.  What about fair 
information practices?  These are, in fact, the building blocks of 
modern data privacy law, and there are various formulations of 
 
 57 See id. at 1663-64. 
 58 See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 309 (An individuals control over medical and 
other personal information cannot be complete because, at least to some extent, these data 
reflect an outside social reality.); see also Schwartz, supra note 54, at 1646 (Personal 
data often involve a social reality that is external to the individual . . . .). 
 59 See Schwartz, supra note 54, at 1647-58. 
 60 See generally, Glenn Chatmas Smith, Weve Got Your Number! (Is it 
Constitutional to Give it Out?): Caller Identification Technology and the Right to 
Informational Privacy, 37 UCLA L. REV. 145, 223 (1989). 
 61 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 54, at 1658. 
 62 See id.; see generally Reidenberg, supra note 52. 
 63 See Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 707, 731-2 (1987). 
 64 See generally Schwartz, supra note 48. 
 65 See id. 
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them.66  Let me give you one that breaks them down into four 
elements.  Fair information practices are: (1) defined obligations 
that limit the use of personal data; (2) transparent processing 
systems, which is the notion that you should know who is doing 
what with your information; (3) limited procedural and substantive 
rights over your information; and (4) external oversight.67  Fair 
information practices also help shape the kinds of constitutive 
territories that we have in our society. 
Now, on to my third and final point.  Let me say something 
about free speech versus privacy.  It seems to me that, aside from 
purely public discourse, a democratic society depends on other 
realms of communication.  I think First Amendment law should 
acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of communication in 
different settings. 
As an initial example of legal scholarship that is sensitive to the 
nuances of communication in different settings, I would point to 
Kathleen Sullivans work regarding speech intermediaries in the 
age of cyberspace.68  As a second example, I would point to the 
work of Robert Post.69  Robert Post has provided a map of 
different communicative domains.  He argues that in the realm of 
community, we regulate speech in terms of civility and dignity, 
and we do that primarily through the defamation tort.70  According 
to Post, in bureaucratic organizations, we regulate speech due to 
the logic of what he calls instrumental rationality.71  Finally, we 
have the public sphere, the sphere of the pure First Amendment, or 
the First Amendment unbounded.  In the public sphere, the First 




 66 See generally Reidenberg, supra note 52. 
 67 See Schwartz, supra note 54, at 1671. 
 68 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of 
Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1653 (1998). 
 69 See, e.g., Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1249 (1995); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in 
the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957 (1989) [hereinafter Social Foundations]; 
Robert C. Post, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 
(1995). 
 70 See Post, Social Foundations, supra note 69, at 957. 
 71 See id. 
 72 See id. 
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The tension in this area then is, on one hand, we have fair 
information practices, and on the other hand we have an 
increasingly strong and growing public sphere.  We have to find a 
way of thinking of fair information practices as structuring the 
terms on which individuals confront the information demands of 
community, bureaucratic entities, and the public sphere.  Now, I 
have offered this vision of mine at a somewhat high level of 
abstraction.  The challenge for justices and judges, for policy 
makers and legal scholars, is to construct an information privacy 
law that becomes an integral part of the mission of the First 
Amendment and not its enemy. 
Thank you. 
MR. GOODALE: Thank you.  Deirdre? 
MS. MULLIGAN: Its a pleasure to be here.  It is not very often 
that I actually get to talk to people who spend a lot of time thinking 
theoretically about things.  It is also very nice to have been led off 
by Paul Schwartz, who has done a lot of very excellent, interesting 
thinking in this area, and actually, like Joel Reidenberg, has done 
some of that translating theory into practice.  And I appreciate the 
ability to look at things practically, which I think is part of what 
Peter Swire invited your assistance in doing. 
Many of us are in the position of dealing with things at the very 
practical level - how do we get from point A to point B - and dont 
always have the luxury of sitting back and thinking big, theoretical 
thoughts about what are the implications of various things going on 
in the marketplace or in the regulatory areas. 
I think that in the privacy area, and in this particular area where 
we are talking about public records - I dont think anybody has 
mentioned the word yet, but that is what I think we are talking 
about today - it is an area where there is an overwhelming lack of 
good writing.  And, like Peter, who invited you to think about 
these issues and write about them, we really need some more 
critical thinking about public records and privacy, and open 
government, and how those things come into play. 
Looking at privacy, as Professor Schwartz reiterated, is an 
incredibly slippery concept.73  Just to give you an idea of what it 
 
 73 See supra note 53. 
PANEL I.FINAL 12/28/00  7:07 PM 
2000] SYMPOSIUM - DATA PRIVACY & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 35 
 
might be like:  I feel like there is an elephant, and different people 
have been reaching at different parts of it, somebody has the ear 
and somebody has the tail. 
If you look at the cases that were presented in your binder, how 
many of you actually read them?  Did you read all of them?  Okay. 
Well, we have a case where a petitioner will come in and say, 
Youre limiting my speech, and the court comes back and says, 
No, were restricting your access.  Then somebody comes in and 
says, Youre regulating a state activity - this is the Drivers 
Privacy Protection Act,74 which wasnt really discussed today, but 
recently Congress decided to actually heighten the limits on what 
states can do with drivers records, and they said, You cannot 
disclose them - there are a few exceptions  without consent.75 
The Supreme Court, in a decision that surprised many people 
across the board,76 whether you are a fan of privacy or a fan of free 
flow of information, or actually think that you can mesh them 
together, which is where I find myself, were stunned when the 
Court came back and said, No, its a commodity in commerce, 
your information.77  Okay, so we have: its a limit on speech, its 
a restriction on access, its a regulation of a state activity, its a 
commodity in commerce. 
We heard Peter talk about privacy as something that we want to 
leave open for the states to legislate because it is a civil right, the 
notion of privacy, I think closest to what Paul was talking about, a 
constitutive right.78 
We hear it spoken of as property.79  Well, that begs the question 
as to exactly whose property.  I think there are people in the 
commercial area who definitely think that once I have handed 
 
 74 Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. 
III 1997) (amended as of Oct 9, 1999 and effective June 1, 2000). 
 75 See Tony Mauro, Federal Act Barring Sale of Data Upheld, N.Y.L.J., Jan 13, 
2000, at 1; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Ban on States Sales of Drivers License 
Information, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2000, at A29. 
 76 See Mauro, supra note 75, at 1. 
 77 See Reno v. Condon, 120 S.Ct. 666, 671 (2000) (holding that [b]ecause drivers 
information is . . . an article of commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of 
business is sufficient to support congressional regulation). 
 78 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and 
Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553 (1995). 
 79 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 397-400 
(1978). 
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something over to them, it becomes their property rather than my 
property80 and we now have very interesting cases talking about 
limits on speech, not on expressive activity.81  I can draw some 
very good analogies of where there are very express tensions 
between privacy and the First Amendment.  If I say to someone, 
You may not send somebody else any messages or you may not 
call somebody, I am setting up a real tension between somebodys 
expressive activity and somebody elses privacy. 
We have laws on the books at the federal level, and at the state 
level, that limit when commercial entities can call people.82 They 
also limit the kind of solicitations you can get in various 
mediums83 - some of the new ones are in e-mail84 - and there are 
carefully crafted balances there, because there are privacy and First 
Amendment interests that are in tension. 
The area dealing with what I would call incidental impacts on 
speech perhaps is what we are talking about when we talk about 
data privacy.  It is true that I might set up some rules about how a 
company can use information that it has gathered about 
individuals, or how the government can use information that might 
make the cost of their speech more expensive.85  So, for example, 
if I cannot target people, I might have to send many more people 
the same message.  That is not a direct limit on my expressive 
activity, which would really kind of raise the First Amendment 
flag.86  However, it may mean that it is more costly for me to reach 
an audience. 
Now, we do deal with an awful lot of regulations that make a 
whole variety of things more expensive and more difficult to do, 
and all of those do not fall by the wayside because of First 
 
 80 See Solveig Singleton, Privacy as Censorship: A Skeptical  View of Proposals to 
Regulate Privacy in the Private Sector (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis No. 295, 1998), 
available at  http:// www/cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-295.html. (last visited Nov. 1, 2000). 
 81 See, e.g., Los Angeles Police Dept v. United Reporting Publg Corp., 528 U.S. 32 
(1999); Amelkin v. McClure, 205 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 82 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(0)(2000); Thomas J. Schramkowski, Commerce and Trade 
Selling and Other Trade Practices, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 9 (1998). 
 83 See Schramkowski, supra note 82.  
 84 See Alderman, supra note 21. 
 85 See United Reporting Publg Corp., supra note 81. 
 86 See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (stating that First 
Amendment scrutiny is triggered whenever an intent to convey a particularized message 
was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the 
message would be understood by those who viewed it). 
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Amendment concerns.87  I think Peter raised this in thinking about 
fiduciaries and in thinking about rules that govern how people use 
information that they may have in a variety of settings where they 
are privy to personal information or facts; and that those rules do 
not all fall by the wayside because they have an incidental impact 
on, for example, the cost of speaking.  So it does raise some 
questions. 
So, what are these tensions that we are talking about when we 
talk about public records and privacy and speech?  Well, many, 
many years ago, when public records laws as they exist were being 
formulated - and it is an area that is very interesting to go back to 
and actually look at and see if there is any kind of legislative 
history or debate at the state level or the local level88 -  they were 
talking about why certain records should be made public.89  I think 
generally, people who have looked have found there is not a whole 
lot of record basis that led to the determination about what 
information was going to be made public or not.90 
I think part of that was because that information was made 
public to benefit certain purposes.91  So, for example, if you were 
selling a piece of property or if you were registering a piece of 
property, that information was going to be available so other 
people could make sure that taxes were being assessed properly 
and fairly, so that the person living next-door to you with the 
identical lot and the same house was not paying $200 and you were 
paying $8,000.  So, there is some mechanism for making sure that 
the government is functioning properly, that people are being 
treated fairly, that records were being made public.92 
 
 87 See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538 (1989). 
 88 See generally, S. REP. NO. 90-1815, pt. 1 (1967); S. REP. NO. 90-1815, pt. 2 
(1967); H.R. REP. NO. 90-1209 (1968); Bruce D. Goldstein, Confidentiality and 
Dissemination of Personal Information: an Examination of State Laws Governing Data 
Protection, 41 EMORY L.J. 1185 (1992). 
 89 See e.g., CAL. GOVT CODE (2000 Supp.) §§ 6270, 6275 (West 2000). 
 90 See generally, Fred H. Cate, et al., The Right to Privacy and the Publics Right to 
Know: The Central Purpose of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 
41, 67-9 (1994). 
 91 See Glenn Dickinson, Comment: The Supreme Courts Narrow Reading of the 
Public Interest Served By The Freedom of Information Act, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 191 
(1990). 
 92 See Cheryl M. Sheinkopf, Balancing Free Speech, Privacy and Open Government: 
Why Government Should Not Restrict the Truthful Reporting of Public Record 
Information, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1567, 1575 (1997). 
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At that time, though, those records were not automated.  Those 
records were buried in buildings at the state and local level.  They 
were very hard to get to.  They were on paper.  They may not have 
been there and searchable under the name of Deirdre Mulligan.  
They might have been by plot number.  They might have been 
cross-referenced by name.  But while they might have been legally 
publicly available, they were practically undiscoverable without an 
awful lot of effort.93 
So, while we might have had a legal regime of public 
accessibility, for many people we had barriers - economic barriers, 
time barriers, distance barriers - that meant that for many of us, 
those private facts that might be contained in those so-called public 
records were not going to be widely available to many people, and 
that for somebody to want to expend the time and energy to 
actually seek out those private facts, they were going to have a real 
interest.  And so at some level, when Paul was talking about fair 
information practices, there is the notion that information should 
be used for the purpose that it was provided.94 
There are some checks that just were part of the way in which 
information was held and stored, the efficiencies of data, that 
meant that for the most part, the people who were using those 
records were going to be using them for the right purpose; that it 
was not very easy just to randomly or casually browse information 
or to put it together with other information that would make it 
useful for other purposes.95 
So what has changed?  Well, I think the United Reporting 
Publishing96 case that you have is a very good example of what has 
changed.  Today, information in every branch of government, 
whether it is the courts, or the welfare agencies, or the school 
records; all of that information is becoming automated,97 and much 
of that information is publicly available.98  What happens when 
information that is publicly available and automated becomes 
 
 93 See id. 
 94 See id. 
 95 See Thomas H. Moore, You Cant Always Get What You Want: A Look at North 
Carolinas Public Records Law, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1527, 1530-31 (1994). 
 96 Los Angeles Police Dept v. United Reporting Publg Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999). 
 97 See Simitis, supra note 63, at 709-10 (pointing out that the privacy debate has been 
altered by the intensive retrieval of personal data on virtually every employee). 
 98 Id. 
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available in the private sector?99 
One of the things that we see happening is that information is no 
longer being used for specific purposes.100  It is being combined 
with data from many different sources.101  It is being used in ways 
that were never contemplated by folks when they made those 
records public to begin with.102  They are being used, rather than to 
promote open government, in fact to create fairly detailed profiles 
about what individuals do that are culled from both data in the 
public sector and data in the private sector.103 
Some of that has some pretty troubling results.  If you look at the 
United Reporting Publishing case,104 you will see that the Los 
Angeles Police Department was talking about their concern that 
records that were being brought out into the private sector and 
compiled into a separate database about arrest records and arrest 
information, were not going to be bound by the same rules that 
might govern that information if it was in a public database.105 
I will give you some examples.  Many states have purge 
requirements,106 many states have suppression requirements,107 and 
they have disposition requirements,108 which mean a few things.  
If, as an individual, I am arrested, that information is not going to 
be available without a disposition: so, was I tried and found guilty, 
or was I innocent, or was there no disposition, was the case not 
followed through on? 
In addition, if, after a certain amount of time, that information is 
no longer found to be useful or relevant for the criminal justice 
system, that information might actually just be purged right out of 
 
 99 Id., at 717-8. 
 100 See e.g., David S. Jackson, Privacy and Ohios Public Records Act, 26 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 107, 108 (1997). 
 101 See Mark E. Budnitz, Symposium: Conducting Business Over the Internet, 49 S.C. 
L. REV. 847, 853-4 (Summer 1998). 
 102 Id. 
 103 See Simitis supra note 63, at 729. 
 104 Los Angeles Police Dept v. United Reporting Publg Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) 
(rejecting a facial attack on CAL. GOVT CODE § 6254(f)(3) which requires that a person 
requesting an arrestees address declare that the request is being made for one of five 
prescribed purposes and that the address will not be used directly or indirectly to sell a 
product or service). 
 105 See Brief for the Petitioner, United Reporting Publg Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999). 
 106 See Zuckman et al. MODERN COMMUNICATION LAW § 4.9 at 519-27. 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id. 
PANEL I.FINAL 12/28/00  7:07 PM 
40 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:21 
 
the system, because society has an interest in making sure that I 
can return to society.109  I have paid my societal debt, perhaps I 
was put away for awhile, but the notion is that there is a re-entry 
into society interest and that having that information continue to 
be very available is not in the individuals interest or in societys 
interest. 
What happens when this information gets brought out into the 
private sector?  Well, many of those public policy decisions that 
were made to balance out a variety of not just privacy interests, but 
also social interests, disappear because the rules that might govern 
the data in the criminal justice system do not flow out and control 
what happens in the private sector.110  So, information might be 
available that is outdated, and it might be available for use for 
purposes far beyond criminal justice systems.111  So, there are 
some real issues that are coming up about whether or not making 
this information public in a grand way and in a flat way, without 
any thought about limiting access or limiting use, is in the publics 
interest.112 
What do I think about it?  Eliot Spitzer talked a lot about the 
market.113  I think it is pretty clear.  I do not know if any of you 
have ever tried to get a drivers license and shopped forums:  Try 
going to New Jersey, you really cannot, there is no market, you are 
dealing with the government.  Many of the services that we get 
from the government, from drivers licenses to health care, are not 
services that we can shop around for. 
I think Peter brought up a very good concept, the notion of a 
fiduciary.114  The truth of the matter is that the government has not 
been a very good fiduciary to us in many respects.  It has not 
applied these fair information practices when it has looked at its 
own handling of data at the local and state level.115  I think that has 
 
 109 See id. 
 110 See Sheinkopf, supra note 92 at 1601. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id., at 1601-2. 
 113 See supra note 53. 
 114 See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 7th ed. (1999) (defining fiduciary as One who 
must exercise a high standard of care in managing anothers money or property). See 
also Restatement (Second) of Agency §13 (An Agent is a fiduciary with respect to 
matters within the scope of his agency.). 
 115 See Los Angeles Police Dept v. United Reporting Publg Corp., 528 U.S. 32 
(1999). 
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put us in the place where we are today, where there are some real 
tensions.  Automation, electronic records, electronic record-
keeping, the quick and easy dissemination of information, and the 
incredibly inexpensive storage of that information means there is 
very little reason for anybody to let go of any data, forcing us to 
revisit issues that we did not really examine closely enough years 
ago. 
I am going to close there. 
MR. GOODALE: Thank you. 
MR. EMMERT: Everybody says, Gee, its great to go last.  
Now I have, not one presentation but three, because I keep 
rewriting it.  Instead of ten minutes, I have two. 
MR. GOODALE: No, thats not right.  Four. 
MR. EMMERT: Okay.  So we are going to go from a marginally 
coherent presentation to a series of non sequiturs, so bear with me. 
I am with LEXIS-NEXIS.  I am an attorney.  I have been there 
for a good ten years.  As the people up in your library will tell you, 
I have no idea how to use the service. 
One of the things that you can all look forward to once you 
graduate from law school and you get a job, especially if you go 
with a corporation, is that you can count on one hand the number 
of cases you will read in a year.  You never have the time to get 
much into that. 
So this has been an interesting year because in the last few 
months I have been very interested in two Supreme Court cases, 
the United Reporting116 case and also Reno v. Condon.117 
We were involved in an amicus brief118 in the United Reporting 
Publishing119 case as a member of the Individual Reference 
 
 116 Id. 
 117 See Reno v. Condon, 120 S.Ct. 666 (2000) (upholding the Drivers Privacy 
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 ed., in Supp. III), which restricts the 
ability of the States to disclose a drivers personal information without the drivers 
consent). 
 118 See Brief of the Individual Reference Services Group and the Software & 
Information Industry Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, 1999 WL 
513672. 
 119 528 U.S. 32 (1999). 
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Services Group (IRSG) and also in prepping Bruce Enis to argue 
the case on behalf of United Reporting, an attorney we helped 
identify and select. 
Why did we do that?  LEXIS-NEXIS has long been involved in 
public records issues.  Im sorry, but were one of those companies 
that kind of helped start us all down this path, because we took all 
that public records stuff that nobody could find and we put it on a 
computer.  We started down that path almost thirty years ago.  
What was seen entirely as goodness at its inception makes people 
nervous now, because in the scheme of things, the scary part about 
what we do is that we make public information available.120  It 
causes us to want to rethink and reevaluate exactly what is in the 
public record.121 
I had an interesting conversation with a state court judge last 
week.  One of the trends we are seeing in the state courts, as they 
start to make more information available electronically, is that its 
not just a matter of making the dockets available.  It is also about 
allowing people to file pleadings electronically.122  Well, if you file 
your pleading electronically, why doesnt the court make the 
pleadings available electronically?  It seems logical. 
So, we are talking about divorce cases where you are getting the 
wifes complaint about how many nights in the last thirty days her 
husband beat her and graphic reports from the doctors about that. 
All of that information is now being made available as a matter of 
public record, which it has been all along but nobody really went 
 
 120 See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 21 at 323 (noting that [p]erhaps the scariest threat 
to privacy comes in the area [of] informational privacy.). 
 121 See id. at 332 (commenting on the ramifications of technology on privacy and 
public knowledge).  The law in general, and each of us in particular, will have to make 
some fundamental adjustments in the way we think of personal information and 
electronic communication.  In doing so, we will ultimately have to change our idea of 
what we can reasonably expect to keep private.  See id. 
 122 See Tracy L. Klestadt & Wayne D. Holly, Gaining Unauthorized Access to 
Bankruptcy Court Electronic Filing System, N.Y. L. J., June 3, 1998 at 1 (discussing how 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District approved a proposal to implement an 
electronic filing system that allows pleadings and other documents to be electronically 
filed).  This proposal includes administrative procedures for filing, signing and verifying 
documents by electronic means and a proposed electronic filing system users manual.  
These procedures mirror a pioneering electronic filing system that is currently used only 
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, where it was implemented in 
January 1996. The Ohio filing system permits pleadings and other documents to be 
electronically signed, verified, filed and retrieved through use of a court-issued password 
and registration process, via the Internet.  See id. 
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to look for it.  But then the next time somebody applies for a job, 
somebody goes online, does a few searches and, Oh my gosh, 
look at this. 
I mean, think about that in the context of the O.J. Simpson123 
case.  What if all of the police reports from all of the investigation 
had been available online?  What would people think about that 
case?  How would you go about selecting a jury? 
Now, I am not trying to make a case against what we do, 
because I like what we do and I think it is an important function. 
One of the big concerns that I have is that the First 
Amendment,124 which guarantees freedom of speech, does not 
draw a distinction between commercial speech and political speech 
or other types of protected speech.125  That is a distinction that has 
been developed by the courts,126 and there is sort of a practical 
issue that is driving that wedge.  My concern is that as you start 
down a path that has repercussions that are not necessarily 
foreseeable, you begin to restrict access to information.127 
We are evil because we sell data.  I have talked to legislators 
in a dozen states in the last year, and I cannot tell you some of the 
reactions I have gotten, like Oh my gosh, you sell this?  It is like 
they want to run you out of their office.  It is like they expect us to 
say, No, no, we just give it away because we are nice guys. 
 
 123 The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, No. 
B3BA097211 (unpublished). 
 124 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 125 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  (The First Amendment reads: Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.). 
 126 See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993) (Our 
decisions . . . have recognized the common sense distinction between speech proposing a 
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject  to government 
regulation, and other varieties of speech. The Constitution therefore affords a lesser 
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. Id. 
at 2703 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)). See generally, 
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16.26-16.31 (4th ed. 
1991). 
 127 See, e.g., Tim J. McGuire, Laws Regarding Data Privacy Should Err on the Side of 
Openness, STAR TRIBUNE NEWSPAPER OF THE TWIN CITIES (MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL) Jan. 
16, 2000, at 23A (warning that data privacy laws create the danger of restricting access to 
information: [A]ny restrictions at all start us down a slippery slope of restricted 
access . . . I have a deep fear that by going after public records the Legislature is going to 
cause serious unintended consequences.). 
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The problem is that what we do is apply technology to 
information to make it accessible, to make it usable, to allow 
people to learn what is going on, whether it is about an individual, 
or whether it is about a government institution.  In many respects, 
we open up information to the public. 
Reporters, and the media, are one of our largest customer 
groups.  Reporters routinely use our service to do research for 
stories.  I will not say that reporters are exactly gatekeepers to the 
information that is made available to the public, but they are 
certainly large facilitators. 
So if you go down this path and you say, Well gee, it is 
commercial speech. Why is it commercial?  It is commercial 
because it [the information, the news] is being sold.  Therefore, 
you [the newspapers] should not be allowed to have access. 
Let us look at the Reno v. Condon128 decision.  If you have read 
the decision, the Court really picks up on the idea that, Oh my 
gosh, the state sells this stuff.129  Somebody made eight million 
dollars last year selling  one state, I think it was Wisconsin - 
access to drivers license data.130  This is just terrible.  It [these 
public records] is a good in commerce.131 
Okay.  Take it one step further.  Lets say the state does not sell 
it.  Let us say the state gives it away.  Is that a good in commerce 
if the state is merely making its information available to its 
citizens?  Do you get a different result in that case if they are not 
selling?  I do not know the answer, but I can tell you that there are 
 
 128 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
 129 Id.  The motor vehicle information which the States have historically sold is used 
by insurers, manufacturers, direct marketers, and others engaged in interstate commerce 
to contact drivers with customized solicitations. The information is also used in the 
stream of commerce by various public and private entities for matters related to interstate 
motoring. Because drivers information is, in this context, an article of commerce, its sale 
or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional 
regulation.  Id. 
 130 See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation receives approximately $8 million each year 
from the sale of motor vehicle information). 
 131 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 58-59 (1995) (identifying three broad 
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power, including 
persons or things in interstate commerce). The Court in Condon affirmed that drivers 
personal information is a thing in interstate commerce and that the sale or release of 
this information is therefore a proper subject for congressional regulation.  See Condon, 
120 S.Ct. at 671. 
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an awful lot of public records that are available today to the public 
and to companies like ours that we do not really buy.  Some states 
simply say You have to reimburse us for the cost of the tape. 
We have 28,000 data sources up right now, and the vast majority 
of the public records databases we have up probably cost us less 
than $75 a month to update.  That is because the government 
makes these records available to the public, not as a commercial 
commodity but as a public service; they simply try to recoup the 
cost of the tapes  that they put the data on before they give it to us. 
Does Congress have the right to regulate the distribution of that 
information?  And if they can regulate the distribution to us 
because, heaven forbid, we are going to actually sell access, then 
ultimately it also means that restrictions on our users, whether they 
are lawyers or reporters, especially investigative reporters, that 
look into government activities, also restrict the ability of the 
public to know what their government is doing. 
Now, Justice Brandeis always gets quoted on this stuff.132  A 
hundred and ten years ago, they scared the bejesus out of him.  
Privacy was down the toilet.  Guys, that was 110 years ago.  We 
are still here.  We still have some semblance of privacy.133  That 
does not mean we do not have problems, but I am not sure it is 
quite the crisis that it is portrayed to be.  It was not the crisis then, 
and it is not quite the crisis now, that it may be perceived to be.134 
Brandeis was also a great believer in freedom of information and 
open government.135  I think that he would be very concerned if the 
reaction was to unduly restrict access to information about 
government and its operations, because in a free and open society 
you have got to know what your government agencies are doing.136 
One of the things I also notice when we talk about the sale of 
information - I was at the newsstand this morning  is that they 
still charge for The New York Times.  So, I guess that stuff is not 
 
 132 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 19 
(1890). 
 133 See id. at 196 (The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing 
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world . . . . [B]ut modern 
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to 
mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.). 
 134 See Alderman supra note 21. 
 135 See Warren supra note 132. 
 136 Id. 
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legal either because they charge for it.  It is obviously commercial 
activity. 
One of the other concerns that I have is this phobia that emerges 
when you apply technology to information.  Anytime you apply 
technology, there is a reaction.  Automobiles?  Automobiles were 
terrible because bad guys would get automobiles and they would 
drive away from the scene of the crime.  There was a great deal of 
concern about this when they made cars.137 
Well, we have got the same problem with information.  The 
presumption is that, if we give information to the people in this 
room, they will misuse it and they will do bad things because they 
are informed.138  I guess it depends on which side of the ledger you 
are on, whether you are doing a bad thing because you are 
informed or a good thing. 
Clearly, there are people who misuse information.  I think you 
need to question the use of the information as much as you do the 
fact that it is available. 
One of the things I have also noticed . . . I do not want to pick on 
this group in particular, so I will share a deep secret here.  A long 
time ago, between my first and second years of law school, I 
actually clerked for the ACLU139 and worked on First Amendment 
issues.  One of the things I have noticed over the last five years is 
that they have gone from being an adamant pro-access-to-
government-records, pro-access-to-government-information, group 
to Oh my gosh, we should close these records, we should limit 
who gets access and why, and we should limit how the information 
is being used.140  It is an interesting switch, and you can see this 
same thing happening with any number of groups.141 
 
 137 See generally, Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 
931, 935 (1996). 
 138 See generally, ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATION LAW § 2.2, at 184 
(1999). 
 139 The American Civil Liberties Union is a non-profit, public interest organization 
dedicated to protecting civil liberties. See generally, ACLU Briefing Paper #1, Guardian 
of Liberty: American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU, New York, NY), 1997, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/library/pbpl.htm. (visited Nov. 1, 2000). 
 140 Implementing the Drivers Privacy Protection Act Positive Notification 
Requirement: Hearing Before the Transportation Subcommittee of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, FDCH Political Transcripts, April 4, 2000 (testimony of Greg 
Nojeim, Legislative Counsel of ACLU). 
 141 See Id. (testimony of Ed Mierzwinski, public citizen, U.S. Public Interest Research 
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The problem is, you dont know whose hands ultimately this will 
play into.  You know it is a civil liberties issue  access to 
information.142  I think you need to think very carefully about it 
before you close access off. 
A couple of other quick points and I will sit down. 
Attorney General Spitzer made a couple of remarks that I just 
kind of wanted to talk about for a second.  Web sites that say that 
for $100 I can get you anybodys credit card, their birth 
certificate, their medical records, their cell phone records. . . - 
Guys, Im assuming people in here are smart enough to realize that 
these are not online services; these are private investigative 
services who have placed ads onto Web sites.  You know, when it 
says send your money here and we will mail the results to you in 
two to three weeks, that it is not an online service.  That is some 
guy working out of his garage who is calling people on the phone 
and lying to them to get access.  It is good, old-fashioned fraud.  It 
is not an online service.  So do not go saying that all these online 
services are out there giving all this stuff away on the Internet.  
That is nonsense.  It is a red herring.  The problem is that these 
offers are being used to justify restrictions on legitimate online 
services.  So do be careful about that. 
Market failures?  You know, there can be a difference of opinion 
on this.  I think that when you start selling data you assume that 
everything is going along just fine, and then, all of a sudden, 
somebody wakes up one day and says Oh my gosh, did you know 
that they were doing. . .or whatever?  When that realization hits, I 
do not think that is a market failure yet.  Certainly we have 
identified a problem, we have identified a problem recently with 
several companies.143  Image Data had a problem with drivers 
license photos.144  We are having a problem right now with regard 
 
Group on behalf of Ralph Nader). 
 142 See Reno v ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 856-7 (1997). 
 143 See In re Trans Union, FTC Docket No. 9255 (July 31, 1998), at 53,  also 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/d9255pub.id.pdf. 
 144 See Robert O Harrow, Jr., Firm Changes Plan to Acquire Photos; Drivers 
Pictures Ignited Privacy Furor, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1999 at E3.  (Image Data LLC is a 
small company that signed contracts with Colorado, Florida, and South Carolina to buy 
their databases of drivers license photographs to create a private network to fight identity 
fraud.  This plan was abandoned after news reports ignited a furor among privacy 
advocates.  In addition, Congress, as well as many state legislatures, have since proposed 
laws restricting access to driver information.  See id. 
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to what we call network advertisers, the ad server companies like 
DoubleClick.145 
The question of a market failure is whether once the problem has 
been identified, does the market respond adequately to address the 
concerns that have been raised?  If the answer is no, then you have 
got a market failure.146  At that point, I think it makes sense for 
Congress or the legislature to step in. 
But until the problem has been identified as a problem, it is not 
efficient for the marketplace to correct it.147  If you are running a 
company, you dont just sit there and say, Gee, what problems 
could possibly happen next month?  You do a little bit of that, but 
you do not do a lot of it.  It is not proactive, but it is not necessarily 
a terribly efficient way to run an economy either - to try to be so 
proactive that you speculate on all the things that could go wrong 
in the future.  You wait.  A problem gets identified, then you have 
to respond to address the problem. 
If the problem is not adequately addressed - for instance, if the 
network advertisers do not come up with adequate rules that will in 
fact protect the privacy of consumers,148 - then at that point I think 
youve got a market failure and at that point it would make sense 
for legislation to happen.149  The question is whether industry is 
going to respond or not.  I do not think weve got a market failure 
with network advertisers yet.  The jury is still out on that one. 
The last one, Im sorry, Im beating up on Mr. Spitzer, and hes 
not here to defend himself.  Thats probably better for me, isnt it? 
Anyway, federalism.150 
MS. MULLIGAN: This is on the public record. 
 
 145 See, e.g., Jeri Clausing, Privacy Advocates Fault New DoubleClick Service, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000 at C2; Deboray Kong, Consumers Fight Back as Online Tracking 
Spreads, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 12, 2000 at 1. 
 146 See Marilyn Geewax, Laws Needed to Protect Online Privacy, FTC Says, COX 
NEWS SERVICE, May 22, 2000. 
 147 See Marilyn Geewax, FTC Seeks Legislation for Internet Privacy; Safeguards 
Called Weak: Democrats Plan Bill, But Republicans Are Wary of Web Regulations, 
ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION, May 23, 2000 at 3D. 
 148 See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Seizing the Initiative on Privacy; On-Line Industry Presses 
Its Case for Self-Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1999 at C1. 
 149 See Geewax, supra note 147. 
 150 See Marcia Coyle, New Term, Big Issues; A Still-Incomplete Docket is Relatively 
Slim, but The Court Is Squaring Up to Major Matters, NATL. L. J., Oct. 4, 1999, at A1. 
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MR. EMMERT: Oh, so he can read this?  Okay.  Well, I will not 
go to New York again for awhile. 
Federalism.  I find it interesting, and I have got to say that, being 
on the industry side of this, I have been truly impressed with the 
way the present Administration has handled privacy issues.151  I 
think they have been extremely careful in this area.152  They have 
been very thoughtful and they have been very careful not to 
overreact.  The interesting thing is that it allows the opportunity for 
the market to work. 
I spent many hours at the Federal Trade Commission153 a few 
years ago talking about industry self-regulation,154 but the result 
was the Federal Trade Commission155 allowed us to work through 
the issues, develop meaningful programs to try to address those 
issues, make sure that they had a way to enforce the programs, and 
then step back and see does it work or not.  We did this with a 
group called the Individual Reference Services Group (IRSG).156 
The work of the IRSG has addressed a number of specific 
problems.157  It is not a panacea.  It does not address everybodys 
problems.  It does not address all privacy problems.  It addresses a 
specific set of problems.  But the Administration gave us the 
opportunity to work with them to come up with a solution that 
made sense, that would allow industry to function, and would still 
protect privacy.158 
 
 151 See e.g., Stephen Labaton, White House and Agency Split on Internet Privacy, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2000, at C1; Norman A. Willox and Gary Clayton, Why Privacy 
Can Hurt Businesses, BUSINESS CREDIT, May 1, 1999, No. 5, Vol. 101, at 38. 
 152 See Jennifer Gilbert, Ad Groups Hail Privacy Pact, Rivals Voice Fears; 
DoubleClick Rep Calls Agreement Tough but Fair, ADVERTISING AGE, July 31, 2000, at 
3. 
 153 Lexis-Nexis to Reveal Personal Data, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 25, 1997, 
at 4. 
 154 See Lohr, supra note 148. 
 155 See Brian Krebs, Senators Agree to Concessions in Identity Theft Bill, NEWSBYTES, 
July 12, 2000. 
 156 Prepared Statement of Steven M. Emmert - Director, Government and Industry 
Affairs, Reed Elsevier Inc. and Lexis-Nexis; President, Individual Reference Services 
Group - Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, 
and Government Information, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, July 12, 2000. 
 157 New National Fraud Center White Paper Addresses Solutions and Challenges in 
Fighting E-Commerce Fraud, BUSINESS WIRE, June 19, 2000. 
 158 See e.g., Online Privacy Alliance Says Web Sweeps Confirm Significant Progress 
in Privacy Self-regulation, BUSINESS WIRE, May 12, 1999; Tom Lowry, One Step Ahead 
of the Law: Information Brokers Agree To Self-Regulation as Governments Begin 
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The Administration has been very good about this, and I find it 
interesting that, under the guise of federalism, the forbearance of 
the Administration or of Congress is being portrayed as an 
invitation for the states to legislate.159  The message to the states 
has really got to be more one of take a step back, look at what is 
going on.  Congress did not act, the Administration did not act, 
not because they do not want to, not because they feel that this is 
an area that the states should legislate in, rather it is because they 
feel that it would be better for the issue to be resolved using market 
approaches that ultimately get the right balance. 
MR. GOODALE: Thank you. 
We only have a few minutes left and we want to get the panelists 
to comment on my questions, or on any audience questions. 
I am tempted to focus the discussion on the issue raised last, that 
is to say, the tension between the right of access to information and 
the privacy of such information.  But since no court has yet held 
there is a First Amendment right of access - and, indeed, the 
United Reporting Publishing160 case held there was no such right.  
I would just say, as a practical matter, that issue is academic. 
Therefore, I want to turn to a practical issue.  I think the hottest 
issue right at this moment when we are speaking, anywhere, is the 
issue of opt-in or opt-out.161  If you look at yesterdays New 
York Times,162 there was an ad by DoubleClick - which through 
cookies, traces wherever you go and sells that information to its 
clients so that these clients can sell advertising to you.  This ad 
says, We are home free, dont worry about privacy at 
DoubleClick because we have an opt-out policy.163  I want to 
ask the panel, lets suppose that Congress passes legislation which 
 
Cracking Down, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, February 7, 1999 at E7. 
 159 See supra note 53. 
 160 528 U.S. 32 (1999). 
 161 See, e.g., Edmund Sanders, Why Your Bank Can (Legally) See Your Secrets; 
Privacy: A Lack of Specific Regulations, has Opened the Door to a Bustling Market for 
Consumers Private Financial Information, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999, at C1; William 
Safire, Consumer Faces Growing Invasion of Privacy, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 24, 
1999, at 38; Lisa Fickenscher, Reporter Notebook: States Expected to Tighten Reforms 
Privacy Provision, AMERICAN BANKER, Nov. 19, 1999, at 11.  See also Michele Heller, 
No Privacy Laws Seen in N.Y. State this Year, AMERICAN BANKER, Mar. 27, 2000, at 2. 
 162 DoubleClick: Committed to Consumer Choice and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 
2000, at C19. 
 163 See id. 
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requires opt-in for entities such as DoubleClick.  Is that 
constitutional?  I just want to point out the tension would be 
between privacy and the First Amendment right of DoubleClick to 
speak. 
MR. SHERMAN: First, I would like to refer the audience to U.S. 
West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission164 where that 
exact issue was raised.  The Tenth Circuit held that requiring opt-
in was unconstitutional and excessive.165  There was a less-
restrictive method of allowing consumers to exercise their choice, 
namely, opt-out.166 
Now, it was a somewhat specific case.  It had to do with CPNI, 
Customer Proprietary Network Information,167 because it was 
information gathered from telecommunications companies.168  At 
least in that context, and that may be appealed, I do not know 
whether there has been a petition for certiorari filed yet or not, but 
at least as of now, the one court, the Tenth Circuit, that has 
addressed it found that restriction went too far.169 
I think it slightly confuses the issue to place the opt-in versus 
opt-out debate in the DoubleClick context because there are at 
least allegations that DoubleClick did not follow or adhere to its 
own privacy policy statement,170 and that is just good old-
fashioned deception if that turns out to be the case. 
 
 
 164 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 165 See id. 
 166 See id. at 1238-39. 
 167 See William J. Sill et al., Man Your Battle Stations, WIRELESS REVIEW, Oct. 15, 
1999, at 32. CPNI is [I]nformation about the destination of a customers calls, the 
telecommunications services to which a customer subscribes, and the frequency with 
which customers use these services . . .[CPNI] data allows companies to measure their 
competitiveness as well as to build their business plans and design new service offerings. 
For the last three years, carriers have found themselves in the middle of a regulatory 
battlefield as the FCC designs and redesigns CPNI regulations.  See id. 
 168 See U.S. West, 182 F.3d 1224. 
 169 See id. 
 170 See, e.g., Will Rodger, Surfer Beware: Advertisers on your trail DoubleClick 
tracks online movements, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 2000, at 01B; Carol Emert, Internet 
Marketer DoubleClick in Hot Water, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 27, 2000, at B.1; 
Chris OBrien, Lawsuit Against On-Line Ad Firm Raises New Questions on Privacy; 
Some Wonder Whether Policies Can Be Trusted, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 7, 2000, at 13; 
Heather Green et al., Privacy: Outrage on the Web, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 14, 2000, at 
38. 
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So I think we have to look at it in a different framework; 
namely, does it violate the First Amendment to require people to 
take the initiative - to give affirmative consent in advance - rather 
than being given notice of their opportunity to say no and take that 
opportunity if they want to?  If I can, just one last statement, 
because I failed to make it while I was the lead-off rather than the 
clean-up hitter, and that is, I believe the real issue will come down 
to harm when you pit the First Amendment against privacy.  We 
know what the First Amendment stands for; it has been developed 
over the past 200 years.  Privacy seems to be evolving. 
I have been on national television shows, once because I simply 
quipped privacy is a state of mind.  That was it.  That is all the 
producer had to hear.  What someone considers invasive, someone 
else couldnt care less about. 
So until we can define privacy, not only in concept, but also with 
respect to what harm is caused when it is invaded, for example, in 
the marketing context, by receiving an unwanted solicitation, we 
cannot shortchange the First Amendment by invoking the 
buzzword privacy.  Something may be one of lifes little 
annoyances, and we all have our list of annoyances, but depending 
on what ones frustration quotient is, one gets very upset, mildly 
upset, or not upset at all.  However, until we can define the harm, 
reliance on an argument of privacy will not overcome First 
Amendment rights.171  Youve got to define the harm, at least in 
the marketing context.  I am not talking about identity theft or 
threat of physical harm.  I am referring to just receiving a 
solicitation. 
MR. GOODALE: Yes.  And in U.S. West,172 part of the problem 
with the case was that no such proof was made, but I think we 
could assume perhaps that Congress would make such a record.  
Your comments about DoubleClick are fair enough.  Nonetheless, 
lets call it the DoubleClick issue for ease of conversation.  What 
is making the Internet go, in some part, as a commercial entity, is 
the fact that there is so much information out there about 
individuals, and those individuals are sales targets like never 
before.  And thats why we should call it the DoubleClick issue.  
Fair enough, it is technically not, but for me there is going to be an 
 
 171 See supra note 53. 
 172 See 120 S.Ct. 666. 
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awful lot of legal action out there over opt-in.  That is why I 
raised it in this context. 
Other comments, or anything else on this from the panelists? 
MS. MULLIGAN: Actually, I wanted to respond to your 
question.  I think if you look at the Reno v. Condon decision,173 
where the Court upheld Congress setting opt-in limits on data 
held by the state,174 they said we [Congress] can regulate state 
databases because personal information is a thing in commerce, it 
is a commodity in commerce.175  I think if the Supreme Court is 
going to say that they can regulate information in the hands of the 
states, where there are federalism concerns, I would find it quite 
probable that they would say that Congress could pass an opt-in 
limit on what private-sector companies do with data. 
While I agree that the U.S. West decision in the Tenth Circuit176 
comes out another way, I also think that it is wrong-headed 
procedurally.  I do not know if you all have read the decision, but it 
was a statutory interpretation question: Was the agency being 
true?177  The agency deserves a lot of deference, under the Chevron 
doctrine,178 which I am sure you are all much more familiar with 
than I am at this point in your careers.  It is still useful, though, and 
the question of whether or not an opt-out or an opt-in was a 
permissible interpretation of the statute was a challenge to the 
statute on its face.179  I think, in light of the Reno v. Condon180 
decision, they might be barking up the wrong tree. 
MR. EMMERT: I would like to respond to that for a moment.  I 
respectfully disagree that Reno v. Condon181 had anything to do 
 
 173 See Reno v. Condon, 120 S.Ct. 666 (2000). 
 174 See id. 
 175 See id. at 13 (Because drivers information is, in this context, an article of 
commerce, its sale or release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support 
congressional regulation.). 
 176 See U.S. West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 177 See id. 
 178 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 
(1984) (setting out a two-step analysis to determine what deference should be given to 
agency interpretations of statutes).  First, if congressional intent is clear, then deference 
must be so given.  If, however, the statute is ambiguous, then it must be determined 
whether the agencys construction of the statute is reasonable.  If it is found to be a 
reasonable construction, then the court will defer to the agencys interpretation.  See id. 
 179 See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1230. 
 180 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
 181 Id. 
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with the opt-in standard.  That is a law that was just passed.  It 
was the Shelby Amendment to the Drivers Privacy Protection 
Act.182  It was passed thirty days before the oral argument in the 
Supreme Court case.183  It was not even before the Court.  If you 
read the decision, there is no discussion of opt-in or opt-out in  
that decision, or about the validity of it.  Reno v. Condon184 is 
strictly a case that was decided on the basis of the Commerce 
Clause,185 and it is ultimately a states rights case under the Tenth 
Amendment.186 
MS. MULLIGAN: As a rejoinder, I agree most of us expected 
that case to come down as a Tenth Amendment case, but if you 
read the decision, I agree with you, there is not a discussion of the 
opt-in; although there is a footnote187 - good Law Review style, 
huh?  In fact, regarding the question of whether it is an opt-out 
or an opt-in, I think it does say that a congressional limit on state 
use of data and state disclosure of data passes the test.188 
MR. EMMERT: If it is in commerce.189 
MS. MULLIGAN: If the issue is if it is an opt-in or an opt-
out, I dont know if that would change the Courts mind one way 
or the other because they certainly could have looked at that. 
MR. GOODALE: I have got to teach Central Hudson190 in about 
six minutes, and I am going to walk right upstairs and do it. 
But lets hear from you, Paul. 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Just very briefly, I think in terms 
of the question of opt-out versus opt-in, a shift is taking place 
away from the full range of fair information practices, to saying 
 
 182 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2721  2725 (West Supp. 2000) (amended as of Oct. 9, 1999 and 
effective June 1, 2000). 
 183 See Reno v. Condon, 120 S.Ct. 666 (2000). 
 184 Id. 
 185 U.S. CONST. art. I. §8, cl.3 ([The Congress shall have the Power] To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.). 
 186 U.S. CONST. amend. X (The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.). 
 187 See Condon, 120 S.Ct. at 669, n.1.  
 188 See id. at 670-671. 
 189 See id. 
 190 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
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that all we need is some kind of notice and then some kind of 
choice.  I think fair information practices are intended to be more 
than that.  The real question, it seems to me, is whether at the end 
of the day, we are going to have fair information practices, for 
example, in cyberspace?191  And then as a part of that broader 
question, we get to the question of, as Mr. Sherman has put it, 
choice.  But I would like to keep our focus on the fact that there is 
a full range of fair information practices that we shouldnt let be 
defined down to notice and then consent. 
MR. GOODALE: Why dont we take questions for the panel. 
QUESTION: A question for Deirdre.  In light of the Drivers 
Privacy Protection Act decision,192 what new restrictions would 
you like to see the Federal Government place on states with regard 
to disclosure of information that they hold? 
MS. MULLIGAN: Personally, I think that this is an area where 
states, as custodians of their citizens records, should take the lead.  
I believe states have a long tradition of dealing with citizens and 
being experimental laboratories.  I do think that providing citizens 
with the full range, as Professor Schwartz said, of fair information 
practices when you are talking about their records is important.  I 
think it is also true that there are always exceptions.  We are 
talking about public records, as you know probably far better than I 
do, we are talking about an enormous range of records.  We are 
talking about drivers license records, we are also talking about 
vital health statistic tapes, we are sometimes talking about cancer 
registries, and we are talking about lots of different kinds of data.  I 
think that it is a really important exercise.   
Peter Swire was talking about the fact that the Federal 
Government has been going through that exercise of looking at 
whether or not they are adhering to the Privacy Act,193 which is the 
Federal Governments fair information practice law.194  I think I 
would personally like to see it happen from the bottom up.  I think 
this is a citizen concern.  I would like to see the states look at this 
 
 191 See Kang, supra note 2, at 1194 (Cyberspace is shorthand for the web of 
consumer electronics, computers, and communication networks that interconnects the 
world.). 
 192 See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000). 
 193 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994). 
 194 Id. 
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issue, and there are a number of states that I think are doing just 
that, with the assistance of their attorney generals, I believe. 
QUESTION: Do you see any attempt to focus at this from the 
perspective of ownership of property?  In other words - I dont 
know how it works with the government - you are effectively 
leasing information as a citizen to the government and you can 
restrict it, and regulation affects that information from a property 
perspective rather than a First Amendment perspective? 
MR. SHERMAN: The answer is I dont think so.  There have 
been two lawsuits where individuals have attempted to claim 
ownership rights in their name, and they have both been 
rejected.195  One was Shibley v. Time,196 back in the 1960s, and one 
was Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Report197 in 1995. 
QUESTIONER: And Dwyer v. American Express.198 
MR. SHERMAN: I am not sure there was a property right 
asserted there.  That was under the Uniform Deceptive Practices 
Act199 and invasion of privacy.200 
QUESTIONER: Why is it not - I mean, I dont know too much 
about this - but why, why has it been so easily dismissed? 
MR. SHERMAN: I dont know the direct answer to that, other 
than I dont think the courts view the fact that a persons name is 
on an aggregate list of hundreds if not thousands, if not millions of 
names, means that there is any property right. 
QUESTIONER: Im talking about the information about the 
person, not so much the name.  But, for example, information 
about medical information or. . . 
MR. SHERMAN: What kind of property right? 
 
 
 195 See Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975); U.S. News & 
World Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No. 95-1318, 1996, WL 1065557, at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 
13, 1996). 
 196 See Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975). 
 197 U.S. News & World Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No. 95-1318, 1996, WL 1065557, 
at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996). 
 198 Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 199 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 505/1 (West 1999); See Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1353 
(discussing Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act). 
 200 See Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1353. 
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QUESTIONER: Somebody was talking about things about 
cancer, I think you were saying that or. . . 
MR. SHERMAN: Im trying to figure out what kind of property 
is that? 
QUESTIONER: I dont know.  Im asking. 
MR. SHERMAN: Maybe it isnt. 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: There is a lot of scholarship 
looking into this area recently, looking at it from the perspective of 
real property and looking at it from the perspective of intellectual 
property. 
The answer in the 1960s, and maybe up until the 1970s, as 
provided by Judge Posner, for example, in the Georgia Law 
Review,201 was that the reason not to look at personal data as 
property was transaction costs.  It was viewed as too expensive to 
aggregate and distribute personal property rights in personal 
data.202 
Well, in the Information Age and the Internet Age, that is no 
longer entirely correct.  Information technology has lowered the 
transaction costs associated with property interests in personal 
data.  So many scholars are viewing privacy as an intellectual 
property issue or a property issue.  But a counter-attack is also 
appearing in the literature in this area that questions the 
commodification of personal data. 
QUESTIONER: Well, it has utility in the sense that it changes 
the regulatory format in which you then talk about it. 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Absolutely.  But what some 
scholars have been saying is it may not advance the debate very far 
to put it, for example, in the intellectual property category.203  
Some of the leading intellectual property scholars in the country 
 
 201 Richard A. Posner, John A. Sibley Lecture: The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 
393 (1978). 
 202 See id. at 398-99. 
 203 See generally, Symposium, Warren and Brandeis Redux: Finding (More) Privacy 
Protection in Intellectual Property Lore, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 8 (1999) (urging that 
while many traditional arguments advanced against including privacy interests under the 
intellectual property umbrella are unpersuasive today, there remains a large gap between 
the protection that intellectual property can provide and that which privacy advocates 
seek.). 
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have said, copyright is traditionally for a limited period of time,204 
although Congress has kept moving that period of time out.205  
Should privacy-as-property last forever?  Should privacy, like 
copyright, continue after your death?  And what do we do with the 
fair use notions?  But there is tremendous intellectual ferment 
taking place about privacy-as-property. 
MR. SUSSMAN: On behalf of the Journal, I would like to thank 
our panelists.  We will now take a five-minute break and then 
return for the second panel. 
 
 
 204 17 U.S.C.A. § 302 (Supp. 1998) (Copyright in a work . . . endures for a term 
consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the authors death.). 
 205 Id. (Amended in 1998 from fifty to seventy years after the authors death.). 
